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I. Introduction 
Indirect costs and indirect cost rates are viewed differently by different participants in the 
sponsored research process. Individual faculty members view indirect costs as an overhead 
charge that is tacked onto their grant applications and worry that high indirect cost rates reduce 
their probability of winning grant competitions and reduce the funds available to them as direct 
costs if they do win. University administrators view indirect cost recoveries as reimbursements 
for expenditures that they have already made to support sponsored research and worry about 
where they will find the funds to maintain these expenditures if their indirect cost rates are 
reduced. Finally, funding agencies worry that high indirect cost rates limit the numbers of 
projects that they can fund and/or the amount that they can spend per project. With all of these 
conflicting concerns, is it any wonder that tension usually exists between the actors in the 
system? 
Table 1 summarizes data provided to us by the National Science Foundation on how the 
unweighted mean institutional indirect cost rate has changed over a recent 11 year period. The 
data show a marked difference in trends between private and public research universities. 
Focusing on the major research universities, the Carnegie classification Research I and Research 
II insititutions, the mean rate across 39 private institutions rose from 60 percent on July 1, 1987 
to 62 percent on July 1, 1990 and then, over the next seven years, fell back to 56 percent. In 
contrast, the mean rate across 85 public institutions rose from almost 45 percent to over 47 
percent during the period. As can be seen from the table, using average rates in effect during the 
fiscal year rather than the July 1 rate, or using data for all research and doctorate universities, 
yields roughly the same patterns. 
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In FY1988, the seven research universities that received the largest shares of federal 
funds for research received 18.9 percent of total federal research funding. By FY1996, the share 
of these seven universities had fallen to 17.4 percent, a 1.5 percentage point decline. Virtually all 
of this decline, 1.4 percentage points, was due to a decline in the shares of the three private 
universities in the group. Similarly, the next thirty-four largest recipients of federal funding in 
FY1988, saw their share fall from 39.9 percent in that year to 38.0 percent in FY1996. Of that 
1.9 percentage point drop, over half, 1.0 percentage points, was due to a drop in the shares of the 
seventeen private universities in the group. 
What is the relationship between the patterns of changes in indirect cost rates and 
research expenditure shares? We shall argue that the reduction in the indirect cost rates 
experienced by the major private research universities since 1990 helped to free up the funds that 
allowed the funding agencies to award a greater share of total research funds to faculty members 
at lower ranked universities. However, the decline in the share of total research funds won by 
researchers at the top universities did not necessarily mean that the researchers themselves 
suffered in terms of either facing a reduced probability of grant receipt or lower total direct cost 
budgets. Rather, it is possible that it was the private research universities who paid the full price 
of lower indirect cost rates because they recovered lower indirect cost volumes than otherwise 
would be the case and that researchers at these institutions suffered no loss in their direct cost 
volume. 
We shall test in the paper whether the main cost of the federal flinders' "dipping deeper 
into the institutional barrel" to fund research projects, was born primarily by the private research 
universities, which had to find ways to finance the indirect cost recoveries that they no longer 
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received. Put another way, we shall test whether lower indirect cost rates hurt the major private 
research universities but not the individual researchers at them. 
The plan of our paper is as follows: Section II discusses the indirect cost rate system and 
introduces the reader to how it functions. Section III uses panel data from the FY1988 to 
FY 1996 period on federal research funding received and indirect cost rates, by institution, to 
understand which institutions win and which lose in terms of total volume of research funding 
when indirect cost rates change. Section IV uses panel data on National Science Foundation 
awards for all research and doctorate institutions during the FY1988-FY1997 period to see how 
indirect cost rates influence an institution's total direct cost funding, total indirect cost funding, 
number of grants and average grant size. Concluding remarks appear in the final section. 
II. What Are Indirect Cost Rates?1 
Most research in science and engineering at universities is funded by the federal 
government. Typically through a competitive process, federal agencies make grants to university 
faculty members to help support their research. Research grants have budgets for both the 
"direct11 and "indirect" costs of projects. Direct costs are those costs that can be uniquely 
attributed to a project. These include, but are not limited to, support for the faculty member's 
time during the academic year and summer, graduate research assistants, post-doctoral fellows, 
lab technicians, computers and other durable equipment, expendable equipment (e.g ., 
chemicals), travel, communications, and clerical assistance. 
Roger G. Noll and William P. Rogerson (1998) present a more complete description of the federal 
research grant process and indirect cost rates. 
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Indirect costs are those costs that a university incurs because it is a research university, 
but which can not be easily assigned to any specific project. Included in this category are the 
central university, college and departmental research administration infrastructure, depreciation 
on both the space in buildings that is used for sponsored research and on research equipment, 
maintenance and utility costs for space used for sponsored research, research infrastructure 
support, and the portion of library costs that can be attributed to the existence of sponsored 
research on campus. 
Each year each university estimates what its indirect costs are likely to be in the 
forthcoming year. It next estimates what its likely volume of direct costs on all externally 
sponsored research will be. Following government directives, it subtracts estimates of the 
portion of the direct costs that are assumed not to be associated with any indirect costs - namely 
those due to equipment costing more than $500, subcontracts that are greater than $25,000 and 
graduate student tuitions - to obtain an estimate of what its "modified total direct costs" 
(MTDC) will be. It then divides its estimated indirect cost by its estimated MTDC to obtain a 
proposed indirect cost rate for the year and requests that this indirect cost rate be established for 
it in the year ahead. 
This is only a request and auditors from the agency that is responsible for setting the rate 
for an insititution, usually either the Department of Defense or the Department of Health and 
Human Services, and the institution itself pour over the data and eventually come to a negotiated 
agreement on what the actual rate will be. If the rate chosen turns out to generate more revenue 
than expected because the institution proved to have a higher value of modified total direct costs 
than it expected during the year, then the excess amount that the university achieved in indirect 
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cost recoveries will be deducted from the institution's permissible indirect cost recovery in future 
years until the excess is paid back. Thus, the university's indirect cost rates during subsequent 
years will be lower than the data for those years alone would indicate that it should have been. 
Many faculty do not understand that a university is not permitted to over-recover its indirect 
costs and believe that, at the margin, their grant imposes no extra indirect costs on a university 
but generates indirect cost recovery for it. 
If, on the other hand, the university under-recovers its indirect costs in a year because its 
volume of modified total direct cost funding proves lower than expected, sometimes, but not 
ususally, the university gets permission to carry forward the amount that it under-recovered to 
the next year. If this occurs, its indirect cost rates would be temporarily higher in the next year. 
In a well-documented case involving Stanford University during the early 1990s, federal 
auditors alleged that items were being charged as indirect costs that were not legitimate cost 
items. While much media attention was directed at this case, ultimately the two parties settled 
the dispute by Stanford's returning a total of $1.5 million dollars to the federal government for 
inappropriate recoveries that it had been alleged that it had made over a ten year period. 
Inasmuch as the University's total volume of federal research funding exceeded an average of 
$200 million a year during the period, the repayment was minuscule and of no real consequence.2 
What was of consequence going forward was that the federal auditors took a much harder 
look at what universities had been including as indirect cost expenditures and increasingly either 
disallowed items that previously had been allowed, or simply "capped" the amounts that they 
'Donald Kennedy (1997) provides a participant's view of the dispute. 
6 
would be willing to pay for some categories of indirect cost expenditures, regardless of the actual 
expenditure that a university had made. Institutions had been allowed to conduct special studies 
to estimate the fraction of their utility and maintenance costs, as well as the fraction of their 
library costs, that were attributable to sponsored research. The federal auditors now more 
aggressively challenged the results of those studies pushing indirect cost rates for these areas 
down at universities that had high indirect cost rates. 
Similarly, the administrative cost portion of the indirect cost rate was capped at 26 
percent, which also reduced the rate at a number of high indirect cost rate institutions. A 26 
percent rate may seem high for research administration until one realizes that included in this rate 
is not just the cost of administrators of research grants at all levels of the university, but also the 
fraction of each administrator's time in the university that was attributable to sponsored research. 
So, for example, a portion of the time of the university's president (who talks to Congress and 
agencies about sponsored research) and the university lawyers (who prepare contracts and defend 
researchers against civil charges by other parties) are both included in this rate. 
As noted above, the indirect cost rates at private universities tended to be higher than 
those at public universities, so it was at the former that rates fell, on average, during the 1990s.3 
A reduction in indirect cost recoveries "costs" the university real dollars to support its operations. 
Much of the difference between indirect cost rates at public and private universities exists because the 
privates have always tried to document as much of the indirect costs that they incur as possible. The publics have 
tended to document less of their costs because funding for their indirect costs often comes from state governments, 
which do not always require repayment of these costs if external research funding and indirect cost recoveries are 
obtained. Given the perceptions by faculty members that high indirect cost rates reduce direct cost funding, the 
publics have had incentives to hold their indirect cost rates down. As budgets of public universities become tighter, 
the publics increasingly are seeking to enhance indirect cost recoveries and this has led them to do more 
documentation of expenses to increase their rates. 
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A university can react by trying to cut its indirect costs, but unless the cutting occurs in areas that 
are over the "caps", doing so will lower permitted indirect cost recoveries in the following years. 
Hence, it appears at first glance that the private research universities were the big losers during 
the 1990s because of the decline in their indirect cost rates. However, lower indirect cost rates 
are often believed by faculty to make their grant applications more competitive and/or to enhance 
the size of the direct costs that they can receive on funded grants. If this belief is true, faculty at 
these institutions may have actually gained from having lower indirect cost rates. 
We must caution, however, that the level fo the indirect cost rate at an institution may 
also serve as a proxy for the availability of research infrastructure at the institution. If a decline 
in an institution's indirect cost rate is associated with a reduction in its research infrastructure, 
this may make its faculty members' grant applications less competitive. Hence, if the private 
universities responded to the reduction in their indirect cost rates by reducing their research 
infrastructures, faculty at these institutions may have lost from having lower indirect cost rates. 
Like most propositions in economics, the impact of changing indirect cost rates is an empirical 
question and it is to answering that question that we now turn. 
III. Empirical Analyses of IPEDS Data: FY1988-FY1996 
Our first analyses look at how changes in indirect cost rates affect the total level of 
research funding received by different institutions. From the Integrated Post Secondary 
Educational Data System (IPEDS), information is available on the volume of total federally 
funded research expenditures at each academic institution for fiscal years 1988 through 1996 in 
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the aggregate and by funding agency. Data are also available from this source on the number of 
faculty employed at each institution each year. These data, along with indirect cost rate data by 
institution and year, as well as information on the stature of each institution's PhD programs as 
of the early 1980s, permit one to estimate equations of the form 
T 
(1) logT = a + aP + a^R + aN + aJogF + alCR + Yia^d+ e 
v 7
 * ijt 0/ 1/ i 2/ i 3 / / Aj ° it 5/ it *-^ 6kj k ijt 
Here Tyt is the level of federal funded research expenditures from agency j at institution i 
in year t, Pj equals one of the institution is public and zero otherwise, Rj is the average rating of 
the institution's PhD programs as reported in the Jones, Lindzey and Coggeshall (1982) 
assessment, Nj is the number of the institution's programs that were assessed in that study, Fit is 
faculty size at institution i in year t, ICR^ is the indirect cost rate in effect at institution i in 
year t, the dk are a set of year dichotomous variables, the eyt is a random error term, and 
the a's are coefficients to be estimated. 
As specified, equation (1) implies that larger institutions, as measured by faculty size, 
will get more research funding. The year dichotomous variables control for the aggregate level 
of sponsored research from the agency in the year and any other year-specific factors. Estimates 
of the coefficient a5j provide estimates of the percentage impact on research funding at the 
institution from agency j , when there is a one point increase in the institution's indirect cost 
rate, other factors held constant. 
The average quality and number of an institution's PhD programs are included as proxies 
for the inherent quality of the institution's research faculty and are expected to be positively 
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associated with its level of research funding. Finally, because public institutions often do not 
seek to fully recover their indirect cost recoveries, they are likely to have better research 
infrastructures than private research universities with comparable reported indirect cost rates. 
Hence, after controlling for indirect cost rates, we expect public institutions to have higher levels 
of research funding. 
While one could estimate equation (1), simple introspection suggests that it can not be the 
correct model to use. The reason for this is that in each year the total volume of research 
expenditures made by a federal agency is fixed, and changes in the indirect cost rate at any 
institution can not affect the total level of sponsored research expenditures that an agency makes. 
Hence, the coefficient on the indirect cost variable in equation (1) can not be the same for all 
institutions unless it is uniquely equal to zero. Imposing such a constraint would prevent us from 
addressing the question of interest to us, namely how changes in indirect cost rates differentially 
affect different institutions. 
Suppose we allow the coefficient of the indirect cost rate variable in equation (1) to vary 
across institutions. It is straightforward to show that the following constraint must hold, 
n (2) E v« = ° 
7 = 1 
Here Sy is the share of total research funding from agency j received by institution i, a5y 
measures the percentage impact of a one point increase in the indirect cost rate on the volume of 
sponsored research funding that institution i receives from agency j and n is the total 
number of institutions receiving funding from the agency. For total agency research funding to 
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remain constant in the face of a change in indirect cost rates, it must be the case that the sum of 
the a5i: each weighted by the share of sponsored research funding from agency j that the 
corresponding institution receives, equals zero. 
In principle, one could specify that each institution has a separate a5ij and, exploiting 
the panel nature of the data, estimate a separate coefficient for each institution. In practice, 
because of colinearity problems, that proved difficult to implement. Instead, some structure was 
placed on how the coefficients differ. One strategy was to sort institutions by their share of 
research funding from an agency, assign them to the funding quintile into which they fell 
(institutions receiving the top fifth of funding, institutions receiving the second fifth of funding 
and so on), and assume that the coefficient of the indirect cost rate variable was the same for all 
institutions within a funding quintile, but varied across quintiles (symbolically a5ij = aq5i where 
q is the quintile institution i was in). Under this set of assumptions, equation (5) reduces to 
(3) a}. + a}. + al + at + al = 0 
V
 ' 5/ 5/ 5; 5/ 5/ 
Whether this constraint is satisfied can easily be tested during the estimation process. 
Table 2 contains estimates of this variant of equation (1) that were obtained using data on 
all Carnegie Category Research I and II and Doctorate I and II institutions for the 
FY1988-FY1996 period. Equations were estimated separately for all federally funded research 
expenditures, National Science Foundation (NSF) funding, Department of Defence (DOD) 
funding and Department of Health and Human Service (HHS) funding at the institutions. 
Institutions were assigned to quintiles based upon their base year (FY1988) funding shares of 
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total federal sponsored research expenditures and each agency's sponsored research 
expenditures.4 Equations were also estimated that included the square of the logarithm of faculty 
size to allow the relationship between faculty size and research funding to be nonlinear. In as 
much as they yielded virtually identical indirect cost rate coefficients, only the simpler 
specifications are reported here. 
Turning to the results in panel A of table 2, as expected, ceteris paribus, public 
institutions do receive more external grant funding in the aggregate and from NSF than to 
comparable private institutions. The average quality and the number of an institution's PhD 
programs that were included in the early 80s rating are also positively associated with the level of 
grant funding. Similarly, institutions with more faculty receive more grant funding, both in the 
aggregate and from two of the three agencies. The constraint that the sum of the indirect cost rate 
coefficients should equal zero is not rejected for the overall and NSF analyses but is rejected for 
the analyses of DOD and HHS data. 
Quite strikingly, the pattern of indirect cost coefficients is the same in each equation. 
Higher indirect cost rates are associated with higher levels of grant funding for all but the bottom 
quintile (in terms of initial external research funding) of these institutions. Conversely, lower 
indirect cost rates are associated with higher levels of research funding for only the bottom 
quintile of institutions. Put simply, indirect cost rate coefficients appear to capture 
The IPEDS system only contains data for academic institutions. Hence, the quintiles which the 
institutions were assigned are actually based on their shares of total academic funding and the constraint in equation 
(3) is strictly valid only if the share of research funding received by academic institutions remained constant over 
time. 
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"infrastructure" effects at the top four quintiles of institutions but "price" effects at the bottom 
quintile of institutions.5 
Equation (1) actually specifies that the only indirect cost rate to influence an institutions 
funding is the indirect cost rate for the institution itself. The effect of all other institution's 
indirect cost rates is captured by the year dichotomous variables that are included in the model. 
While this is a perfectly reasonable estimation strategy, a more general strategy allows the 
research funding at each institution to also depend upon the total level of federal research funding 
available nationwide and the average indirect cost rate in the year. That is, we replace the year 
dichotomous variables in equation (1) by the logarithm of the total level of research funding (Tjt) 
and the average indirect cost rate in the year (ICR^ and estimate 
(4) logTijt = aQJ + aXjPt + a2jAt + ajt, + aJogFu + aSjJCRu + aJGR, + a7/ogTJt + €y , 
where IQ^ is the mean indirect cost rate in year t across institutions and T:t is the total 
level of external research funding from agency j available nationwide in the year. 
Ideally, one would like to allow the coefficients of the mean indirect cost rate and the 
total level of research funding to vary across the research funding quintiles of institutions as we 
did for the institutions' indirect cost rate coefficients. However, doing so introduces serious 
colinearity problems into the model. Hence, these are treated as being constant across 
institutions. When one does this one obtains the results shown in panel B of Table 2. The 
An increase in the indirect cost rate increases indierct cost funding, and hence total external research 
funding, holding constant direct cost volume. Thus, as long as direct cost volume increases, or decreases by a 
smaller absolute amount than indirect cost funding increased, total external research funding will increase. Strictly 
speaking then, the estimated indirect cost coefficients we obtain for the top four quintiles of institutions may reflect 
only that flinders' "price elasticity" of demand for research from these institutions is inelastic. 
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pattern of institutional indirect cost coefficients is very similar to those found in panel A. Higher 
indirect cost rates are associated with higher levels of total external grant funding for institutions 
in the top four quintiles of recipients, but lower levels of total external grant funding for 
institutions in the bottom quintile.6 The coefficients in these equtions of the mean indirect cost 
rate variable are insignificantly different from zero and those for the log of total research funding 
are insignificantly different from one. It is straightforward to show that under the assumptions 
that these two variables' coefficients are constant across quintiles of institutions, these coefficient 
values must be obtained if the model is to be logically consistent. It is also true that there is a 
relationship that must hold between the institutional and average indirect cost rate coefficients. 
In particular, it must be the case that 
1 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 (5) a5j + a5J + a5J + aSJ + a5J + 5a6j = 0 
It has been suggested to us that if the positive association between indirect cost rates and total research 
funding observed in Table 2 is due to high indirect cost rates indicating better research infrastructure, then if one 
disaggregates the analyses by field, one should observe different results for fields depending upon whether the 
research of faculty members in the field make heavy use of infrastructure. 
To see if this occurs, we reestimated models similar to those found in both panels of Table 2 for total 
federal research expenditures, using field specific data. The fields chosen for investigation were engineering, life 
sciences, physical sciences, psychology, and social sciences. Our conjecture was that the first three fields make 
heavy use of research infrastructure and the last two make much less use. Thus, we hypothesized that the results for 
the first three fields would be much more similar to the aggregate results than the results for the latter two fields. 
The pattern of indirect cost rate coefficients that we obtained for engineering and the life sciences were in 
fact identical to the aggregate results reported in Table 2. For physics, the coefficient for top quintile institutions 
was positive and statistically significant and the coefficient for bottom quintile institutions was negative and 
statistically significant, with the other three coefficients being statistically insignificantly different from zero. For 
psychology, all of the indirect cost rate coefficients were insignificant. Hence, the results for these four fields did 
provide support for our "infrastructure" hypothesis. 
However, we obtained results for the social sciences that were very similar to those for engineering and the 
life sciences. With psychology pulled out as a separate field, the lion's share of funding for social science goes to 
economics. While economists do make some use of research infrastructure (e.g., supercomputers, data archives), we 
were somewhat surprised by the social science results. 
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This constraint is not rejected in either the total research funding equation or any of the 
individual agency funding equations. 
An alternative estimation strategy to assuming that the response of federal research 
funding to indirect cost changes is the same for all institutions within a funding quintile, but 
varies across quintiles, is to assume that the response varies across institutions systematically 
with an institution's initial share of research funding. That is, to specify that 
T 
(6) logr.., = bn. + b.P. + b,R. + b.N. + b.logF.t + b.ICR.t + b,ICR.S.. + Y,b-.d. + e., 
x f b
 ijt 0/ 1/ / 2/ / 3/ ( 4/ * it 5/ it 6/ it IJ £—* "jk k ijt 
We expect that b5j will be negative and b6j will be positive. Hence, -b5; divided by b6: 
will indicate the "cross-over" share. Institutions with initial shares of an agency's federal 
research expenditures in a year that are larger than this cross-over share will find their total 
research funding from the agency positively associated with their indirect cost rates, while 
institutions with smaller initial shares that this cross-over share will observe a negative 
association. 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the indirect cost rate coefficients that were obtained when 
this model was estimated using total federal research funding expenditures and research funding 
received from each of the three agencies by the institution. Panel B presents analogous 
coefficients obtained when the year dichotomous variables were replaced by the average indirect 
cost rate in the year and the logarithm of total (or total agency) external research funding in the 
year. The indirect cost rate coefficients proved to be identical in the two model specifications. 
As expected, the indirect cost rate coefficient (b5j) is negative and the coefficient of the 
interaction of the institution's indirect cost rate and its 1988 funding share (b6-) is positive in all 
four data sets. The largest estimated cross-over share occurs in the total federal research funding 
equation and is .014. In FY1988, 18 universities had share of total federal research funding that 
was at least that large and their cumulative share of total external federal research funding was 
about 37 percent. 
This cross-over share model thus yields results that are qualitatively similar to those of 
the previous model. Total federal research funding obtained by an institution is positively 
associated with the institution's indirect cost rates for research and doctorate universities initially 
near the top of the distribution of funding recipients and negatively associated for universities 
that are not among the top recipients intially. However, in this specification, a smaller fraction of 
institutions (those with roughly 40 percent of initial funding rather than the 80 percent of the 
previous model) benefit from having high indirect cost rates. Cross-over shares for DOD and 
HHS funding were much lower and thus these models yielded very similar results to the previous 
specification, in terms of the number of institutions that benefit from higher indirect cost rates. 
The astute reader will note that we have yet to exploit the panel nature of the data. An 
obvious estimation strategy is to add institutional fixed effects to the model, difference them out, 
and then estimate the model in first difference form. When we did this, primarily insignificant 
coefficients were obtained. One reason for this is that many federal research grants are multi-
year. Federal research expenditures at an institution in a year are the sum of expenditures from 
new research grants awarded to the institution in the year and research grants awarded to the 
institution in previous years. Changes in indirect cost rates in a year should influence research 
16 
expenditures from grants awarded in the year, not expenditures from grants received in previous 
years. Hence, because IPEDS reports only total federal research expenditures by an institution in 
a year, not research expenditures from grants newly awarded during the year, we have 
considerable measurement error in our dependent variable. As is well known, first differencing 
when measurement error is present exacerbates measurement error problems.7 
IV. Empirical Analyses: National Science Foundation Data 1988-97 
A weakness of the analyses presented in the previous section is that they refer only to 
total federal research funding received by an institution in the aggregate from an agency. The 
IPEDS data do not contain separate information on direct cost funding, indirect cost funding, 
number of grants received by institution, and average award per grant. Hence, they can not be 
used to ascertain how changes in indirect cost rates influence each of these outcomes at different 
types of institutions. Such an analyses is necessary if one wants to disentangle the effects on 
institutions and individual researchers of indirect cost rate changes. 
Table 4 presents the indirect cost rate coefficients obtained from models similar to those 
found in Table 2, that make use of unpublished data provided to us by the National Science 
Foundation that cover the FY1988-1997 period. While Table 2 contained results only for an 
Several strategies were pursued to take account of this problem. Indirect cost rates for the current and two 
lagged years were included in the model rather than just the current rate. A three year average rate was also used. 
Finally, we estimated models using five year differences rather than one year differences and a model using a ten-
year difference. None of these efforts substantially improved the performance of the fixed effects models. 
A second type of "measurement error" arises in the indirect cost rate variable itself. Some adjustments in 
an institution's rate occur over time because of over-recoveries of indirect costs by the institution in previous years. 
Such changes in the rate affect the "price" of research at an institution, but not its research infrastructure. We can 
not isolate such changes in our data. 
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institution's total research funding from the federal government, this table presents results for 
total funding, indirect cost funding, direct cost funding, numbers of grants per faculty member, 
and grant dollars per grant, all from the National Science Foundation. Our analyses again 
address only research and doctorate universities. Unlike, IPEDS, the NSF data had information 
on the entire set of funding recipients, not just academic recipients. No research or doctorate 
institution fell in the bottom quintile of all funding recipients in FY88, so indirect cost rate 
coefficients for only the top four quintiles of institutions are reported. 
Ceteris paribus, a higher indirect cost rate at an institution is associated with higher total 
NSF funding, higher indirect cost funding, higher direct cost funding, more grants per faculty 
member, and a higher dollar value per grant for institutions in the top three quintiles funding 
recipients. Only for the institutions in the fourth quartile is there evidence that higher indirect 
cost rates are associated with lower total NSF funding, lower direct cost funding, lower indirect 
cost funding, fewer grants per faculty member and a lower dollar value per grant.8 
Jeffrey Sundberg (1994) collected and analyzed information on 65 institutions receiving NSF research 
grants during the FY1985-88 period and 109 institutions receiving Public Health Service (PHS) research grants 
during the FY 1984-87 period. Sundberg found that higher indirect cost rates were associated with fewer awards 
per faculty member and a lower institutional direct cost volume. However, the estimated elasticities were quite 
small. Hence, he concluded that faculty researchers, as a group, were marginally made worse off by higher rates. 
He also concluded that increases in indirect cost rates hurt faculty at high-quality schools more than faculty at 
low-quality schools. 
Sundberg defined an institution's quality by the fraction of its faculty that had won prestigious awards (e.g., 
elected to the National Academy of Sciences). When we instead defined institutional quality as we have 
throughout this paper (share of funding in the base year), used our model specifications (that allows testing of the 
adding up constraint that exists across institutions), and used his NSF data set (which he very kindly provided to us) 
to reestimate the models reported in Table 4, we obtained results similar to those found in Table 4. In particular, 
higher indirect cost rates were associated with higher direct cost funding for institutions in the top two quintiles of 
funding recipients and lower direct cost funding for institutions in the third and fourth quintiles. So even in the 
earlier period's data (FY1985-88), we find no evidence that faculty at institutions that initially receive the largest 
shares of NSF funding lose when indirect cost rates are raised. 
18 
While a negative relationship between an institution's indirect cost and its level of direct 
cost funding is consistent with faculty members' often stated view that higher indirect cost rates 
hurt them, this appears to occur only at lesser (in terms of initial NSF funding) institutions. At 
institutions which are the major recipients of NSF funding, higher rates appear to signal better 
research infrastructure and are associated with more direct cost funding. 
Table 5 presents similar estimates for a "share" specification, whose explanatory 
variables are similar to those found in the models underlying Table 3. The coefficient estimates 
are very similar to those found in that table. An increase in the indirect cost rate is associated 
with higher total NSF funding, direct cost funding, indirect cost funding and grants per faculty 
member for large "initial share" institutions and a decrease in each outcome for small initial share 
institutions. What constitutes a large initial share depends upon the outcome in question. 
However, the estimates suggest that the benefits of have a higher indirect cost rate accrue only to 
institutions that are among the top 60 to 110 in terms of their initial share of NSF research 
funding. Conversely then, these are the institutions that lose when their indirect cost rates are 
reduced. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
Our analyses of the EPEDS and NSF data sets yield a consistent set of conclusions. 
Changes in indirect cost rates do influence the allocation across different institutions of total 
federal research funding, direct cost funding, indirect cost funding and numbers of grants. On 
balance, increases in indirect cost rates benefit institutions that are already large recipients of 
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federal research funding and their faculty. In contrast, institutions that are not initially large 
recipients of funding and their faculty, benefit from reductions in indirect cost rates. Federal 
flinders appear to use the funds that are freed up by reductions in indirect cost rates to "spread" 
their research funding over a larger set of institutions and faculty. Reductions in average indirect 
cost rates at private institutions that have taken place during the 1990s can be seen as part of this 
process. 
We find no evidence in our analyses that faculty members at major research universities 
that have high indirect cost rates are penalized for these high rates by lower probabilities of grant 
receipt or lower volumes of direct cost awards. Put another way, we find no evidence to support 
the common perception of faculty members at these institutions that high indirect cost rates hurt 
them.9 This perception appears true, however, at lesser institutions (in terms of federal funding 
received) because federal flinders appear to "dip deeper" into the pool of potential fundees when 
indirect cost rates are lower and this frees up more funds to be allocated to proposals from lesser 
institutions. Faculty members at these institutions are hurt by high indirect cost rates overall and 
high indirect cost rates at their own institutions. 
Our conclusions need to be tempered, of course, because the data used in our analyses 
were based upon institutional research expenditures out of federal funds and numbers of federal 
One possible reconciliation of faculty perceptions with our empirical results was suggested to us by Eric 
Hanushek. Suppose that higher indirect cost rates do reduce the ability of existing faculty at a university to obtain 
grants. Suppose also that to attract a distinguished senior scientist, a university invests millions of dollars in lab 
space. Such expenditures will find their way into the indirect cost base and lead to an increase in the institution's 
indirect cost rate. If the professor proves as productive as anticipated, he may attract large grant funding, which 
more than offsets the lost funding experienced by existing faculty at the institution due to the higher indirect cost 
rate. In this situation, one would observe a positive relationship between indirect cost rates and volume of research 
funding for an insitution; however, professors other than the new arrivee would have lost from having the higher 
rate. 
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research grants active in a year. They were not based upon new grant awards and expenditures 
from new grants. The latter are presumably the outcomes that changes in indirect cost rates in a 
year should influence, but we are unable to directly observe them with the data at hand. Because 
of this, attempts to control for unobserved institution specific variables using a fixed effects 
approach did not prove successful. As is well known, measurement error in outcome variables is 
compounded by using fixed effects methods. The availability of institution level data on new 
grants and their funding levels each year would greatly improve the analyses conducted here. 
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Table 1 
Changes in Mean Indirect Cost Rates" 
(standard deviation) 
Year 
In Effect on July 1, Year 
All Private Public 
Average During Fiscal Year 
Starting July 1, Yearb 
All Private Public 
A) Research I and Research II Institutions 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
[n=124] 
50.0(11) 
50.4(11) 
50.9 (10) 
51.6(10) 
51.6(9) 
50.0 (9) 
50.0 (9) 
49.5 (8) 
49.9 (8) 
49.9 (8) 
49.8(8) 
[n-39] 
60.0(11) 
60.0(10) 
61.0(10) 
62.0(9) 
60.5 (8) 
58.0(13) 
57.0(12) 
57.0(11) 
57.0(11) 
56.0(11) 
56.0(12) 
[n=85] 
44.8 (7) 
45.4(7) 
46.1 (6) 
47.1 (6) 
47.2 (5) 
46.9 (5) 
47.0(9) 
46.6 (4) 
46.9 (4) 
47.0(4) 
47.2 (4) 
[n=124] 
50.2(11) 
50.4(11) 
51.3(10) 
51.4(9) 
51.6(9) 
49.7 (9) 
49.6 (8) 
49.7 (8) 
49.9(8) 
49.3 (9) 
48.4(9) 
[n=39] 
60.0(11) 
60.5 (10) 
61.0(9) 
61.5(8) 
60.5 (8) 
58.0(12) 
57.5(11) 
57.0(11) 
56.0(11) 
56.0(14) 
54.5(14) 
[n=85] 
45.1(7) 
45.5 (7) 
46.7 (6) 
46.9 (5) 
47.2 (5) 
46.6 (5) 
46.6 (4) 
46.7 (4) 
46.9 (4) 
47.0(4) 
46.5 (4) 
B) Research I, Research II, Doctorate I and Doctorate II Institutions 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
[n=226] 
51.3(12) 
51.7(12) 
52.0(11) 
52.2(10) 
52.1 (10) 
50.4(10) 
50.6 (9) 
50.1(9) 
50.0 (9) 
50.0 (9) 
49.8 (9) 
[n=80] 
61.0(11) 
60.8(11) 
60.8(10) 
60.4 (9) 
59.9 (9) 
57.3 (12) 
57.1 (11) 
56.8(11) 
56.5(11) 
56.6(10) 
56.7(10) 
[n=146] 
46.3 (9) 
46.8 (9) 
47.3 (8) 
47.7 (8) 
47.9 (8) 
46.7 (7) 
47.0 (6) 
46.4 (5) 
46.4 (5) 
46.4 (4) 
46.5 (4) 
[n=226] 
51.5(12) 
51.6(11) 
52.2(11) 
52.1(10) 
52.1(10) 
50.4(10) 
50.2 (9) 
50.1 (9) 
50.0 (9) 
49.2 (9) 
48.3 (9) 
[n=80] 
60.6(11) 
60.1 (11) 
60.7(10) 
60.2 (9) 
59.9 (9) 
57.1(11) 
56.8(11) 
56.9(10) 
56.4(11) 
55.1(12) 
53.7(12) 
[n=196] 
46.6(9) 
96.9(8) 
47.6(8) 
47.7(8) 
47.8(8) 
46.7 (6) 
46.6(5) 
46.4 (5) 
46.5 (5) 
46.0 (6) 
45.6(6) 
a
 Indirect cost rate for on-campus research 
b
 Fiscal year t starts on July 1, year t - 1. 
Source: Authors' calculations from unpublished data provided to the authors by the National Science Foundation's 
Economics Program. 
Table 2 
Impact of Indirect Cost Rate on the Logarithm of 
Federal Research Expenditures, FY88-FY96: 
All Research and Doctorate Institutions 
(absolute value oft statistics) 
1 All | 
A) Includes Year Dichotomous Variables 
PUB 
RANK 
NRANK 
LFAC 
ICR1 
ICR2 
ICR3 
ICR4 
ICR5 
I? 
n 
Test that Sum of 
Coefficients Equals Zero 
.252 (3.8) 
.543(11.0) 
.066 (6.9) 
.352 (7.5) 
.016(3.8) 
.008(2.1) 
.009 (2.7) 
.002 (0.4) 
-.021 (6.7) 
.714 
1961 
.01 (0.9) 
Bl Excludes Year Dichotomous Variables 
LTOT 
ICRA 
PUB 
RANK 
NRANK 
LFAC 
ICR1 
ICR2 
ICR3 
ICR4 
ICR5 
i? 
n 
Test That Sum of 
Coefficients Equals Zero 
1.564(3.5) 
.042(1.1) 
.251 (3.8) 
.543(11.0) 
.066 (6.9) 
.353 (7.6) 
.016(3.8) 
.008(2.1) 
.010(2.7) 
.002 (0.5) 
-.021 (6.7) 
.714 
1961 
.228(1.3) 
JNSF | 
.225 (3.6) 
.446(10.0) 
.091 (9.9) 
.342 (7.9) 
.012(2.7) 
.008(2.1) 
.006(1.6) 
.001 (0.2) 
-.018(6.1) 
.702 
1889 
.01 (0.5) 
1.105(4.3) 
-.007 (0.3) 
.225 (3.7) 
.447 (10.0) 
.090 (9.9) 
.344 (7.9) 
.012 (2.7) 
.008(2.1) 
.006(1.6) 
.001 (0.2) 
-.018(6.1) 
.702 
1889 
-.029 (0.2) 
DUD | 
.086(1.0) 
.445(9.1) 
.137(11.7) 
.059(1.0) 
.069 (9.3) 
.039 (6.7) 
.027 (5.4) 
.012 (2.7) 
-.009(2.1) 
.559 
1670 
.14(6.1) 
.339 (0.4) 
-.109(1.8) 
.087(1.0) 
.445(9.1) 
.137(11.7) 
.058(1.0) 
.067 (9.2) 
.039 (6.7) 
.027 (5.4) 
.012 (2.8) 
-.009(2.1) 
.570 
1670 
-.410(1.3) 
HHS 
-.028 (0.9) 
.699 (15.3) 
.101(10.0) 
.262(5.1) 
.036 (8.2) 
.026 (6.8) 
.034 (8.6) 
.028 (7.8) 
-.009 (2.7) 
.746 
1844 
.11(6.7) 
1.004(2.3) 
.033 (0.8) 
-.028 (0.4) 
.700(15.3) 
.101 (10.0) 
.263(5.1) 
.037 (8.2) 
.026 (6.8) 
.033 (8.6) 
.028 (7.8) 
-.009(2.7) 
.746 
1844 
.282(1.4) 
where 
Total 
NSF 
DOD 
HHS 
and 
- all federal research expenditures at the institution 
- National Science Foundation funded expenditures 
- Department of Defense funded expenditures 
- Department of Health and Human Service funded expenditures 
Indirect cost rate for institutions that are in the j t h quintile (l=top) of funding recipients in FY88. Quintiles 
are measured in terms of percentage shares, not percentages of institutions, and are defined separately 
for each agency. 
PUB - l=public institution, 0=private institution 
RANK - average rating of institution's PhD programs in the Jones, Lindzey and Coggeshall (1982) 
assessment (l=low, 5=high) 
NRANK - number of the institution's PhD programs assessed in Jones, Lindzey and Coggeshall (1982) 
LFAC - logarithm of faculty size 
LTOT - logarithm of all federal research expenditures nationwide (All column) or all agency research 
expenditures nationwide (other columns) in the year 
ICRA - average indirect cost rate in the nation in the year 
Source: Research Expenditures, Faculty Size and Program Ratings (CASPAR), Indirect Cost Rates 
(NSF). 
Table 3 
Impact of Indirect Cost Rate on the Logarithm of 
Federal Research Expenditures, FY88-FY96: Share Specification3 
(absolute value of t statistics) 
Total NSF 
A^  Includes Year Dichotomous Variables 
ICR 
ICRS 
F? 
n 
Cross Over Share 
-.018(5.7) 
1.28(14.5) 
.702 
1952 
.014 
-.016(5.4) 
1.26(12.0) 
.694 
1880 
.013 
E\ Excludes Year Dichotomous Variables 
ICR 
ICRS 
B? 
n 
Cross Over Share 
-.018(5.7) 
1.28(14.5) 
.702 
1952 
.014 
-.016(5.5) 
1.26(12.0) 
.695 
1880 
.013 
DOD 
-.003(0.7) 
.41 (14.1) 
.511 
1661 
.007 
-.003 (0.7) 
.41 (14.1) 
.512 
1661 
.007 
HHS 
-.009 (2.6) 
2.19(23.1) 
.718 
1835 
.004 
-.009 (2.7) 
2.19(23.1) 
.718 
1835 
.004 
ICR - indirect cost rate coefficient 
ICRS - coefficient of the product of the indirect cost rate and the institution's 1988 share of total 
research funding from the agency. 
a
 See Table 2 for model specification and notes. 
Table 4 
Impact of Indirect Cost Rates on Institutions' National 
Science Foundation Funding: FY88-FY97 
(absolute value of t statistics) 
Log Total 
Expenditures 
Log Indirect 
Cost 
Expenditures 
A) Includes Year Dichotomous Variables" 
ICR1 
ICR2 
ICR3 
ICR4 
& 
n 
.023 (5.3) 
.013 (3.9) 
.009 (2.8) 
-.019(6.6) 
.611 
2009 
.025 (5.5) 
.016(4.5) 
.013 (3.9) 
-.013 (4.2) 
.581 
1926b 
Log Direct Cost 
Expenditures 
.023 (5.3) 
.013 (3.8) 
.008 (2.7) 
-.019(6.7) 
.611 
2009 
Log Grants 
Per Faculty 
Member 
.016 (4.9) 
.008 (3.2) 
.005 (2.3) 
-.016 (7.6) 
.519 
2009 
Log Grant 
Dollars Per 
Grant 
.007 (2.9) 
.005 (2.6) 
.003(1.9) 
-.002(1.5) 
.197 
2009 
See Table 2 for model specifications. 
a
 Models that excluded year dichotomous variables and added the average indirect cost rate and the logarithm of 
total NSF research expenditures nationwide yielded virtually identical indirect cost rate coefficients. 
Some insitutions received direct cost only funding from NSF in some years which reduced the number of 
observations. 
Table 5 
Impact of Indirect Cost Rate on 
Institutions National Science Foundation 
Funding, FY88-FY97: Share Specification 
Logarithm of 
Total 
Funding 
Indirect Cost 
Funding 
A) Includes Year Dichotomous Variables 
ICR 
ICRS 
F? 
n 
Crossover 
Share 
-.016(5.2) 
1.462(10.0) 
.557 
2009 
.011 
-.010(3.0) 
1.273(8.3) 
.531 
1926b 
.008 
Direct Cost 
Funding 
-.016(5.4) 
1.473(10.1) 
.562 
2009 
.011 
Grants Per 
Faculty 
Member 
-.014 (6.2) 
1.145(10.4) 
.447 
2009 
.012 
Average 
Funding Per 
Grant 
-.002(1.1) 
.317(4.1) 
.182 
2009 
.006 
See Table 2 for model specifications. 
a
 Models that excluded year dichotomous variables and added the average indirect cost rate and the logarithm of 
total NSF research expenditures nationwide yielded virtually identical indirect cost rate coefficients. 
Some insitutions received direct cost only funding from NSF in some years which reduced the number of 
observations. 
